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In this thesis I explore the foundations of the respective theories of knowledge for 
both Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. Particularly I direct attention towards 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Husserl’s lectures given at the University of 
Göttingen entitled Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge; which were given 
between the release of his Logical Investigations and Ideas I. I wish to explicate the 
similar questions that the two philosophers addressed, and that both saw the answers 
to the issues of knowledge as being founded in the Copernican view of an analysis of 
subjectivity and the a priori. Kant’s Copernican revolution establishing grounds from 
which Husserl was able to enact his phenomenological investigation of the role of 
subjectivity. Yet, I also wish to explore the distinction within their methodologies of 
arriving at what constitutes a priori knowledge and the effect this difference of 
methodology causes in their respective epistemological theories, leading to the 
conclusion showing their different respective concepts regarding the accessibility of 
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In this thesis I discuss the foundations of both Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl’s 
respective epistemological theories. My focus has been particularly on Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason and Husserl’s earlier phenomenological works; his lectures 
on logic and theory of knowledge given at the University of Göttingen, and his 
Logical Investigations. I have sought to compare and contrast the two philosophers 
positions, particularly by looking at the influence of the Copernican revolution, not 
only in Kant’s works, but also that which Husserl took from this. Though they both 
held to the Copernican view of the importance of the a priori as grounds for theory of 
knowledge, how they arrive at and what constitutes a priori knowledge is different for 
both philosophers.  
 
I begin by discussing the context of Kant’s critical project and the importance of 
David Hume’s skepticism concerning knowledge. Kant’s critical project began as a 
response to the scathing critique Hume had lain against causality, and as what Kant 
took to be all synthetic a priori knowledge. In seeking to resolve this issue Kant 
enacted what he called his Copernican revolution, where he changed the focus from 
the objective constraints on knowledge to the subjective constraints on knowledge, 
just as Copernicus had shifted the viewing of the celestial bodies. This allows Kant 
the ability to establish the categories of the understanding as the synthetic a priori 
concepts that afford us the ability to come to knowledge.  
 
The categories become crucial to Kant’s further arguments regarding the analogies 
and the possibility of experience. Of particular importance is the category of causality 
that Kant sought to defend from Hume’s critique, which Kant further uses, in his 
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analogies, as that which gives an objective time determination to our experience of 
successive states of affairs. What this eventually leads Kant to is the argument that the 
systematic unity of reason is the arbiter of truth. Truth becomes about fitting within a 
coherent system of nature, and from this we can establish knowledge. Truth and 
knowledge are thus liable to change as experience changes, what is important is the 
coherence to the systematic unity of reason.  
 
From this I move on to discuss Husserl’s theory of knowledge. I have chosen for the 
purpose of this thesis to focus on his earlier works to avoid being drawn into a 
discussion of the two thinkers respective transcendental arguments. Furthermore, I 
have focused predominantly on Husserl’s lectures, since Husserl himself intended 
them to surpass his arguments regarding epistemology in his Logical Investigations.  
Husserl founds his arguments on questions concerning the possibility of the grasping 
of the objective by the subjective, referring to the importance of observation in the 
empirical sciences as giving something objective within a subjective act.  
 
From this Husserl establishes a unique type of skepticism, that of the 
phenomenological reduction or epoché. In enacting the epoché we are able to 
establish the grounds of any knowledge; that of the reduced, transcendent ego of pure 
consciousness, through the separation of the act and content of any direction of the 
consciousness. What becomes crucial is this separation of what Husserl distinguishes 
as the intentional act and intentional content of any conscious act; the division of act, 
meaning and content.  
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This is also the point from which I explicate the major divergence in the two thinkers 
respective theories. Husserl holds that we must establish the a priori from this base 
point of consciousness, as that which relates to essences, which are the transcendent-
in-immanence. Where Kant had held that an analysis of synthetic a priori laws of 
reason are the grounds from which any knowledge can be established, Husserl argued 
that even these principles of reason must be established from the position of the 
epoché. This being what leads to a major difference in their respective theories, 
including Husserl’s holding that objects in-themselves can be grasped, contrary to 
Kant’s concept of noumena. 
 
Chapter 1: David Hume and Issues Concerning Knowledge 
 
I. Hume on Knowledge 
 
Putting Kant in context is crucial to understanding what it was he originally sought to 
achieve with his critical project. During the period in which Kant found himself the 
dominance of rationalist metaphysics had been overtaken by the emerging realm of 
British empiricism. The champion of this empiricism was the Scottish philosopher 
David Hume, who with Book I of his Treatise of Human Nature (1740) and his 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777) explicated many issues 
traditionally associated with metaphysics, which in turn had flow on effects into other 
disciplines. The principal ideology behind Hume’s empiricism being that “all the 
materials of thinking — perceptions — are derived either from sensation (“outward 
sentiment”) or from reflection (“inward sentiment”)” (Morris 2013). Hume directing 
his questioning towards the possibility of how we could come to know anything about 
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the world and ourselves, not attacking a particular philosophical theory, but the 
possibility of knowledge itself (Biro 1993, 37).  
 
Firstly, we must acknowledge that for Hume knowledge is strictly limited to relations 
of ideas and matters of fact. This is explicitly put in his Enquiry, where Hume states; 
“All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, 
to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact” (EHU 4.1). Furthermore, Hume also 
states in the Treatise under the section entitled “Of Knowledge”;  “… of these seven 
philosophical relations, there remain only four, which depending solely upon ideas, 
can be the objects of knowledge and certainty” (T 1.3.1).  
 
Secondly, we also see that Hume, particularly in the passage above from the Treatise, 
links knowledge to that of certainty. For Hume certainty excludes all doubt, thus 
anything that can be considered knowledge must not contain any form of doubt, and 
to remove all doubt is to find the claim to be necessarily true, thus this is required if it 
is to have such certainty that allows for knowledge. Since if the opposite of something 
is plausible, there remains doubt, if the opposite is not plausible the proposition is 
necessarily true and it holds certainty. Meeker (2007, 229) puts Hume’s theory of 
knowledge as “…S knows p if and only if (i) S’s assent to p arises from a comparison 
of ideas and (ii) S is certain that p.”  
 
However, for Hume certainty, taken as above, can only be obtained for relations of 
ideas. It is that we could never deny that a triangle has three sides, as it is necessarily 
true and thus certain as a relation of ideas. As regards matters of fact, we cannot hold 
such certainty, for as Hume states “The contrary of every matter of fact is still 
	  
	   5	  
possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind 
with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality” (EHU 
4.1). The example Hume himself uses to explicate this, in the Enquiry, is that of the 
sun rising, for it is not an unintelligible proposition that the sun will not rise tomorrow 
in the same way that a triangle without three sides is, this issue being that the contrary 
of a matter of fact is not a logical impossibility. In this matters of fact cannot hold the 
same certainty, derived from necessity, that relations of ideas hold, which allow them 
to be known for Hume. 
 
Thus, for Hume, knowledge of matters of fact are always contingent. This is because 
since it is plausible, no matter how improbable, that the opposite of any matter of fact 
could occur, then we cannot be certain of that matter of fact until it occurs, we can 
instead have belief based on probability. However, without such certainty it cannot be 
considered knowledge in the Humean sense and must remain contingent. Thus 
matters of fact can never be considered to be known universally for Hume, as they 
can only become knowledge once they have occurred, for it is always plausible that 
the opposite could have occurred, thus we could not know prior that the opposite 
would not occur, because we are uncertain and this cannot, for Hume, amount to 
knowledge.  
 
II. The Critique of Causality 
 
From Hume’s explication of knowledge we can begin to see issues forming with 
regard to that of causality and inductive reasoning, Hume going as far as to say “All 
reasoning’s concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause 
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and Effect” (italics in original, EHU 4.1). Of course this leads to issues for scientific 
knowledge which is often based upon causal connections, say for example, Hume’s 
theory of knowledge would not be able to justify as knowledge the proposition that 
iron will rust in water, since matters of fact are contingent and cannot be taken as 
universal laws, even based on this relation of cause and effect. This is because Hume 
would argue that we could conceive of iron that does not rust in water and so it does 
not gain the necessity that gives the certainty that is a requirement of knowledge.  
 
For Hume the question remains, where has this dogmatic belief in the principle of 
causality come from? For Hume causality is a reflective impression, viz., that it is a 
purely mental comparison of already established ideas, as opposed to one given 
directly by sensory impression. Hume declaring directly that this is contrary to the 
belief that causal connections come directly from experience (EHU 4.1). How this is 
formulated is that in multiple instances we will have had sensory impressions giving 
us the ideas of X and Y in conjunction, therefore in reflection we place that this 
conjunction is necessary and X is cause of Y or vice versa, creating a causal 
connection. The actual establishing of any causal connection is thus not experienced 
and merely of the reflective nature, as a mental process, going beyond that of our 
senses (T 1.3.2).   
 
However, such a connection is not made out of necessity and it cannot be considered 
as knowledge. Hume stating;  
“From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never 
will arise any new original ideas, such as that of a necessary connexion; and 
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the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confin’d 
ourselves to one only.” (T 1.3.6) 
Thus, what Hume leaves us with is a scathing critique of causality as the basis of any 
knowledge, removing much of what could be considered knowledge; particularly in 
the sciences, where experimentation is founded on establishing causal principles to 
produce universal laws such as that of iron rusting in water. 
 
III. The Critique of Inductive Reasoning 
 
However, this critique goes further than to just causality, for it causes issues for 
inferential knowledge of all kinds and opens Hume’s critique to include that of 
inductive reasoning as a whole. Importantly it is Hume’s establishment of issues of 
necessity that holds bearing over inductive reasoning. As Robert Fogelin (1993, 94) 
states in asking the question, “How does the experience of events being consistently 
conjoined in the past license an inference to the claims that they will continue to be 
conjoined in the future?”, Hume’s critique is able to reach inductive reasoning as a 
whole.  
 
Acceptance of past experience having weight over future is based on the principle 
“that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which 
we have had experience” (italics in original, T 1.3.6). However, Hume declares that 
following the reasoning used in his critique of causality we would see the issue with 
the aforementioned principle, viz., that there is really no argument that can afford us 
this assumption (Fogelin 1993, 95). Hume asks us, if we cannot be afforded this 
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assumption, then how can we establish the ground of inductive reasoning? This being 
one of the questions Kant would later pick up from Hume.  
 
The issue with inductive reasoning is that all arguments for inductive reasoning are 
based on circular reasoning. This is that to argue for inductive reasoning we must 
assume that it is probable that the nature of the world doesn’t change, however we 
only make this assumption based on inductive reasoning itself, which of course 
already requires this assumption (Fogelin 1993, 95). Hume explicates this in his 
Abstract (1938, 651), stating; “All probable arguments are built on the supposition, 
that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the past, and therefore can never 
prove it.”   
 
Thus what we find, if we cannot demonstratively or through probability prove this 
assumption, that inductive reasoning cannot lead us to knowledge. This is because it 
cannot provide us with certainty, which of course is required for knowledge under the 
Humean theory. Thus all knowledge of matters of fact must remain contingent, as 
nothing can provide us with justifiable universal laws regarding such.   
 
Chapter 2: Kant’s Copernican Revolution 
 
I. Kant’s Response to Hume 
	  
Immanuel Kant stated in the preface to his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 
that; “no event has occurred that could have been more decisive for the fate of this 
science [metaphysics] than the attack made on it by David Hume” (1783, 7). Kant 
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went as far as to defend Hume’s skepticism against the common-sense rebuttal, even 
crediting Hume with opening his eyes to the dogmatic holding of the principle of 
causality, which in turn led to his critical project (De Pierris and Friedman 2008). 
However, though it may seem Kant held in high regard many of the points Hume 
made, his critical project, particularly his Critique of Pure Reason (1781-1787), 
sought to defend the a priori foundation of the laws of understanding, which Kant felt 
Hume had rejected, and to find grounds to defend scientific knowledge, for which 
many issues had been established via Hume’s critique of causality and inductive 
reasoning. 
 
For Kant, Hume’s critique of causality goes much further than to just causality and 
inductive reasoning. Kant explaining in his Prolegomena;  
“I thus first tried whether Hume's objection might not be represented 
generally, and I soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and 
effect is far from being the only one by which the understanding thinks 
connections of things a priori; rather, metaphysics consists wholly and 
completely of them.” (Kant 1783,10) 
Since it seems that Hume is critiquing the a priori nature of causality, it would seem 
that this could be taken further as a critique to other laws of understanding, which 
establish the foundation of any metaphysics. 
 
The issue becomes, what are these connections, which exist a priori, in their 
universality. Crucially there is a distinction between judgements that Kant felt Hume 
missed, that of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements (B19). 
Analytic judgements are those judgements where the predicate belongs to the concept 
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as something contained within it, where as synthetic judgements are those judgements 
where the predicate is connected to the concept, yet still something outside of it 
(A6/B10).  Where Hume discussed relations of ideas, these are always analytic 
concepts, say for example a triangle having three sides, since such a judgement is 
contained within the concept. Where as matters of fact are synthetic judgements, for 
example the causal connection between iron rusting and water is not contained within 
the concept of either water or iron itself, but is established through a connection.  
 
What Kant is left with is that Hume’s issue was not particularly with cause and effect, 
but that of synthetic a priori judgements. However Kant argues, had Hume realised 
the scathing implications of such a critique he would have not held it, for Kant argues 
that both the natural sciences and mathematics are necessarily founded upon synthetic 
a priori judgements (B20). Thus in seeking to solve this issue Kant’s critical project 
began with the question how can synthetic a priori judgements even be possible. 
 
II. The Foundation of the Revolution  
 
In answering the question raised concerning synthetic a priori judgements Kant had to 
commit himself to a Copernican style revolution. Where Copernicus shifted the focus 
from the celestial bodies moving relative to the Earth, to the Earth moving relative to 
the celestial bodies, Kant shifts from the objective influence on knowledge for the 
subject, to the subject’s influence on any object of knowledge. Kant establishing a 
radical shift away from previous metaphysics, which Kant believed held that the 
understanding must conform to objects of knowledge, Kant instead looking to how 
objects of knowledge must conform to the processes of understanding. Thus, where 
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Hume looked to the objects of knowledge for external validation of causality, and 
what Kant retrospectively labelled as all synthetic a priori judgements, Kant turned to 
look inwards at the subject for such validation in establishing any knowledge of 
causal principles.  
 
So Kant’s questioning asks how anything knowable must firstly conform to our 
processes of understanding, which in turn makes it knowable for us to begin with, as 
Kant states; “For where might even experience get its certainty if all the rules by 
which it precedes were always in turn empirical and hence contingent so that they 
could hardly be considered first principles?” (B6). Here Kant strikes a blow against 
Hume’s empiricism, pointing out that it would seem that Hume had not realised that if 
there were no such first principles, that of synthetic a priori judgements, which govern 
the understanding, how then could we come to knowledge through experience with 
the certainty that was so crucial to Hume’s theory of knowledge. We would instead be 
in a state where we never could gain certainty of experience, since this certainty itself 
would have to come from experience, of which we do not yet have the certainty of a 
first principle that we require to gain knowledge of it. 
 
What Kant established here is that in coming to any form of understanding both 
concepts and intuitions must be present, as he states “Thoughts without content are 
empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). If everything were to be 
derived from intuitions then it would be unintelligible, as it would not have the 
concepts to make such understandable, it would thus be blind. In making anything 
knowable, an intuition must be brought to a concept, a manifold must be brought into 
the unity of consciousness and have a concept applied to it, yet concepts alone have 
	  
	  12	  
no content to give us knowledge, they act as the form of knowledge, thus both are 
required. Therefore there must be some laws that go beyond the empirical, some pure, 
viz., non-empirical, laws by which we can make understandable intuition at all.  So 
the question is, what laws of the understanding must exist that allow us to understand 
anything in the first place? 
 
III. On the Objective Validity of the Categories 
 
These first laws of the understanding, which are pure synthetic a priori concepts, are 
what Kant refers to as the categories. The categories are those laws that direct reason 
in its relation towards intuitions, for as Kant states; 
“…reason must indeed approach nature in order to be instructed by it; yet it 
must do so not in the capacity of a pupil who lets the teacher tell him whatever 
the teacher wants, but in the capacity of an appointed judge who compels the 
witnesses to answer the questions that he puts to them.” (Bxiii) 
It is that there must exist some form of categories that afford reason this questioning, 
viz., that any object of knowledge must conform to our process of understanding, yet 
our process of understanding also must be given content from the senses, as intuition, 
for it to direct its questioning towards. However, the issue still remains as to how 
Kant is to establish what these categories are at all.  
 
In any act of the understanding an intuition is synthesized under a concept, to make it 
understandable to the subject, this produces a judgement. In making judgements we 
apply this process of understanding, we apply a concept, which holds for many, 
directly to an object, e.g. the judgement that all bodies are divisible (A68/B93). 
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Therefore in any judgement there is a necessary synthesis, which makes the objects of 
the judgement understandable to us, this synthesis is the process of the understanding. 
Since this process of synthesis is purely of the understanding it is transcendent, as it 
goes beyond that of any empiricism. But for Kant the question is what is it that allows 
this synthesis, thus he is concerned with “…the dissection of the power of 
understanding itself” (italics in original, A65/B90). That which makes up this 
synthesis is the pure concepts of the understanding, the categories; that which allows 
this synthesis (Young 1992, 105). However, since Kant has established such a 
transcendent synthesis as necessary, thus the categories, as the laws of this synthesis, 
are also shown to be objectively valid, since without them this necessary process of 
synthesis could not be possible. 
 
Hence, to establish what principles can be considered categories an analysis of 
judgement is necessary, since when we look to that which is contained within 
judgements, yet is also transcendent, we can gain access to the categories of the 
understanding. Taking the above example of the judgement all bodies are divisible we 
are able to establish, after removing the empirical content and concepts, certain 
transcendent concepts, say for example of the mode of quantity, as the concepts of 
unity and plurality in the process of division, that apply universally, yet are pure, in 
that they contain no empirical content themselves. They thus become transcendent, as 
they go beyond that of the empirical and are necessary a priori to make any 
understanding of the world possible and allow us to establish them as necessary 




In relation to Hume’s critique of causality, Kant establishes that causality is a 
necessary transcendent a priori concept. It is that causality is one of the forms of 
relation that intuitions can have with one another and it is necessary as a law of the 
understanding. Where Hume had established that causality was developed a posteriori 
from the continual conjunction of certain experiences, Kant has instead established 
that causality is not developed at all, it is founded in its necessity as a pure a priori 
concept, that in itself is necessary to our process of understanding and making things 
knowable. The role of causality is as a synthesis of our understanding; it is thus 
necessary a priori as one of the categories which allow us the synthesis of relations of 
objects of knowledge. Therefore, Kant, through the establishing of the objective 
validity of the categories, has dealt with Hume’s critique of causality and furthermore 
the issue of a priori synthetic judgements, of which Kant was only able to establish 
through his Copernican revolution. 
 
IV. Transcendental Idealism  
 
There is however a further conclusion to be made from Kant’s analysis of the 
categories and the role of his Copernican revolution. In Kant’s reliance on 
establishing that objects of knowledge must conform to our process of understanding, 
and using this to establish the objective validity of the categories, it also presents the 
issue of whether we can know things beyond our process of understanding. This leads 
Kant to establish the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism; summarized by Gardner in 
his book Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (1996, 95-96) as;  
“Transendental idealism may be defined then as the metaphysical thesis that 
objects of our knowledge are mere appearances they are empirically real but 
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transcendentally ideal. Transcendental idealism means that objects do not have 
in themselves, independent of our mode of cognition, the constitution which 
we represent them as having; rather, our mode of cognition determines 
objects’ constitution. For Kant, all previous pre-Copernican metaphysical 
positions are the same in supposing that objects of our cognition are 
transcendentally real, that they have constitution which we represent them as 
having, independent of our mode of cognition, so that things can in principle 
be known as they are in themselves. Transcendental idealism thus expresses 
the Copernican thesis that objects should be (or must be) considered to 
necessarily conform to our mode of cognition; where transcendental realism is 
committed to the pre-Copernican view that our mode of cognition conforms to 
objects.”  
 
Though Kant has established that our process of understanding and coming to 
knowledge is objectively valid, he has not yet established that our knowledge of 
objects is objectively valid. It would seem at this point that objects of knowledge are 
only subjectively known, this however is incorrect. Graham Bird (1982, 91) argues 
that Kant is not appealing to an individualised subjectivity, rather relativism within a 
system of belief. It is that all humans require these processes of understanding, based 
on the objectively valid categories, and thus knowledge must conform to this, as the 
essential process of understanding of human beings, rather than as an individualized 
subjectivity, it is merely that it must conform to human understanding.  
 
Objects are only given to us through a process of a necessary synthesis on the part of 
the subject. When an object is given to us (as subject) in the manifold and is made to 
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be a presentation for us, this is the synthetic unity of apperception. It is only through 
the process of a unifying synthesis within the subject itself that allows the object to 
become an object for that subject. On this Kant states; 
“The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations. For 
otherwise something would be presented to me that could not be thought at all 
– which is equivalent to saying the presentation either would be impossible, or 
at least would be nothing to me.” (B132)  
And as previously mentioned the only way a presentation can become ‘mine’ is 
through this necessary synthetic unity of apperception and applying of the categories 
to such.  
 
Thus, the transcendental subject is merely that which can accompany all of the 
thoughts and presentations that are mine and is that which makes them mine to begin 
with. This is transcendental as it is necessary a priori for any knowledge; it is that 
which makes the synthetic unity of apperception possible within the subject itself. Yet 
it is also the act of apperception that makes the transcendental subject what it is in the 
first place. Kant stating on this; “Hence only because I can combine a manifold of 
given presentations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to present the identity 
itself of the consciousness in these presentations” (italics in original B133).  
However, this consciousness cannot come to know itself through itself, it is merely 
through the senses. For nothing manifold is given in the transcendental subject, thus it 
is not able to become knowable as an intuition applied to a concept, it is through the 
presentations that become mine in the one presentation of the transcendental subject 
that self-consciousness is achieved (B135).  
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Thus Kant also presents the concept of a transcendental object; which is that which 
unifies the manifold given to us in an intuition as a concept of that object (B139). This 
is the association of presentations together that allows us to view an object as an 
object rather than just raw sensory data, we are able to put together the manifold as a 
certain object, say piece together the legs, top, colour etc., of a table to allow us to call 
it a table in the first place. It is this concept of a transcendental object that must be a 
priori for us to even be able to establish an object as an object, however it only applies 
objectivity to the unity of consciousness. This is because in the process of 
apperception different people may take different meanings for different things, it is 
that direct apperception only gives us subjective representations of empirical objects, 
however we cannot challenge the meaning of the transcendental subject through the 
conceptual transcendental object, thus giving it, and solely it, objective validity at this 
point (B140).  
 
What this leaves Kant with is that we can postulate the concept of objects independent 
of how our cognitive processes work, however, we cannot know how they are in this 
state independent of us, as they are in-themselves. Rescher (1981) interprets Kant as 
saying that since the concept of a transcendental object does not have content then it 
is required that there be the concept of something that appears, but is not the 
appearance, as the appearance requires the undergoing of sensibility, this being the 
ding an-sich (thing in-itself) or noumenon. This is a rather interesting concept in that 
it rejects a purely idealistic notion, postulating that there are things independent of 
cognitive processes, which we require as a concept for our cognitive structures, but 
that they themselves are not given directly to us as they are, in fact they are nothing 
for us, not a thing at all, merely that concept which allows us a concept of 
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appearances or phenomena, but which these concepts themselves require as a 
grounding (Rescher 1981). Thus we also find that empiricism is rejected in a way, as 
we cannot gain everything required for knowledge purely through the means of that 
which appears, since we cannot know that which appears in the appearance at all; we 
require those transcendental principles that make knowledge possible in the 
application of sensibility. Instead what Kant leaves us with is a doctrine that tends to 
bridge the gap between both idealism and empiricism as per the previous Gardner 
quote. 
 
Chapter 3: The Analogies of Experience 
 
I. The First Analogy: Substance 
 
So far we have established a brief grounding of Kant’s theory of knowledge in his 
Copernican revolution and his movement away from the positions held by the 
rationalists and empiricists before him with his doctrine of transcendental idealism, 
however it seems there are still many questions to answer in regard to that of 
objective empirical knowledge in light of Kant’s radical Copernican shift. 
Particularly, Kant’s radical shift has been critiqued by scholars such as Pritchard 
(1909, 118); who argues that that objects of knowledge exist independent of the 
knowledge of them and that knowledge is an uncovering of this reality of said objects, 
however within Kant’s new doctrine it becomes difficult to establish how we can 
come to this kind of knowledge, since the reality we are able to apprehend and the 
reality of mind-independent objects, or noumena, are separate. So Pritchard presents 
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the question of how Kant can confirm any form of knowledge within his new 
philosophic doctrine of transcendental idealism? 
 
Kant’s answers again lies in the basis of his Copernican revolution, it is that objects of 
knowledge must conform to our structure of experience and in an analysis of this we 
can come to understand how our knowledge of empirical objects is grounded. This 
analysis is found in Kant’s three analogies, the focus of which is explicating those 
principles that allow us experience of empirical objects in the first place. It is crucial 
here to understand the distinction Kant makes between empirical objects and our 
representations of them. By way of the senses, in presentations, we are only given 
representations of empirical objects, we require more than presentations to be able to 
come to knowledge regarding empirical objects in-themselves, the explication of 
these principles of reason which allow us to move beyond our representations alone 
and to come to knowledge of empirical objects being the goal of the analogies.  The 
principle of the analogies as a whole being; “Experience is possible only through the 
presentation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (italics in original, 
A176/B218).  
 
The first analogy Kant presents is in regards to substance, the principle of which is 
that; “[i]n all variations by appearances substance is permanent, and its quantum in 
nature is neither increased or decreased”(italics in original, A182/B224). Kant 
begins his proof for this principle with the argument from time determination, stating 
that objects determined in time can be in one of two relations, either simultaneous or 
successive. Being relations of time they must remain related in the one time, thus this 
one time must be permanent, for if not such relations could not be facilitated. 
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However, we cannot perceive time in-itself, since we apprehend everything in 
succession, therefore something permanent must remain in all experience. Thus Kant 
states, “therefore permanent in the appearances is the substratum of all time 
determination” (A183). Without such permanence there would be no ability for 
objective time determination. 
 
Now it is crucial to state here that the analogies are interdependent and that the 
relations of succession and simultaneity are greater explained in the following 
analogies. However, to begin the reliance of the latter two relations of time are reliant 
upon this permanence that facilitates time determination to begin with. It is that this is 
that which is the condition for the possibility of experience and all existence within 
time itself, and as Kant states, “…all variation in time can only be regarded, by 
reference to this permanent, as a mode of the existence of what is enduring and 
permanent” (A183/B227). This principle of the permanence of substance is required a 
priori for us even to have experience, for without it we would not be able to establish 
the basis of any objective time determination.   
 
That which varies in substance is its determinations, substance itself merely 
undergoes changes, it cannot come into or go out of existence. The example Kant uses 
to explain this is the law of conservation of matter; if we were to burn wood it would 
be taken that the ashes together with the smoke equate to that which was the wood 
prior, this is the appeal to the permanent substance that underlies this change of state 
(A185/B228). We can only know this change occurred because of the principle of 
permanent substance, for if we didn’t we would assume the ash and smoke came out 
of nothing, rather than from the wood itself, a new substance could have been created 
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and the old destroyed ex nihlio. This would cause the removal of the time 
determination of the example, since both could have occurred simultaneously, thus 
there would be no objective grounds for any time determination. Therefore the wood 
could exist simultaneously with the ash and smoke, since they are not connected by 
the permanence of substance, and without such a connection we wouldn’t have the 
issue that is present with permanence of substance, that the substance cannot be both 
in the state of wood and not in the state of wood at the same moment in time. Instead 
we would just be able to assume that one substance went out of existence and another 
came into existence ex nihlio, rather than a change in the one substance, giving us no 
objective time determination of the succession since the succession would no longer 
be necessary.  
 
This example though is an appeal to the Newtonian physics which Kant was trying to 
defend against the critiques of Hume, however it would seem in today’s current 
understanding of physics this example is wrong, since we know that there is more that 
occurs than the mere change of wood to smoke and ash. This however is not an issue 
for Kant as explained by Guyer in his book Kant and the Claims of Knowledge 
(1987). Guyer (1987, 233) explains that whilst Kant does appeal to the law of 
conservation of matter, this is not the role of the principle, we must take into account 
that Kant himself states that the principles of the analogies are regulative 
(A179/B222) and thus they do not themselves give to us empirical knowledge, rather 
they regulate, as opposed to constitute, our use of reason in regards to our experiences 
in a way to allow us to establish empirical knowledge. Thus when scientific 
advancement found that matter is not completely conserved, or to use Kant’s terms, it 
is no longer permanent, that is that it can become energy instead, matter is no longer 
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considered to be that which is substance, since analytically for something to qualify as 
a substance it must be permanent. For it is that for Kant substance is that which is 
permanent, he did not seek to synthetically show that substance must be permanent, 
he showed that substance, as that which is permanent, must exist in all our 
appearances to allow us time determination. So instead we can establish new 
empirical knowledge based on our experiences, but the principle of permanent 
substance remains unchanged.  
 
Kant leaves us with this principle of the permanence of substance as a necessary 
principle underlying our structure of experience, as per the principles of his 
Copernican revolution, allowing us to determine states of affairs with regards to their 
objective determination in time. For if we did not allow for such a principle we would 
not in the slightest be able to establish why one state of affairs cannot be both it and 
not it at the same moment in time; there would be no logical incompatibility if 
substances could come into or go out of existence ex nihlio. Thus, if we did not 
account for such a principle we would merely have the subjective determination based 
in our apprehension, which is always successive, since we cannot perceive time in-
itself, and we would not be able to come to any understanding that certain states of 
affairs can be successive or simultaneous in time, since they could at all times be in 
either time relation, rather than necessarily as one or the other. So what we must look 
to next in the analogies is those principles that determine succession or simultaneity 
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II. The Second Analogy: Causality 
 
In the example used in the first analogy regarding wood, smoke and ash, Kant was 
using states of affairs that are successive, it is that we find that both could not exist in 
the one moment since the permanence of substance means that the wood, in its 
totality, could not both be present whilst its changed state of ash and smoke is. 
However, the example and use of the principle of permanent substance does not 
determine the ordering of such states of affairs, it merely shows that they cannot both 
occur simultaneously. Thus we must now look to that principle that determines that 
one state necessarily succeeds the other in experience, Kant stating this principle as, 
“[a]ll changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect” 
(italics in original, B232).  
 
Where it was that in the first analogy that Kant showed through the permanence of 
substance we could not have a state of affairs that is X and not X at the same time, 
(since it causes a contradiction of logic) this is not enough to allow us the basis of 
why one must be former and one latter. It is that in succession there is an 
irreversibility regarding states of affairs and another rule is required to afford us 
experience of this time determination. We must first make the distinction clear 
between that of the subjective time relation of apprehension, which is always 
successive, and that which is an objective time relation of succession; if we are to 
view a ship going down stream we would first have to have the state of it being up 
stream and then the state of it being further down stream, this is what we would 
consider an objective time relation as it is necessary. However, if I am to view the 
ship itself and see from the bow to the stern as the succession of my apprehension, we 
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would determine it is not necessary that I am presented with it in this way, since I 
could have viewed it in the opposite way, from stern to bow, thus this time relation is 
merely subjective based only on the presentations in which the subject views the ship 
in apprehension.  
 
But the question still remains why is this so? What is it that determines that one event 
can only be apprehended in a necessary ordering yet the other in any order? This is 
where Kant invokes the principle of causality; it is that in the case of the ship moving 
down stream a cause must be established to give the rule that we cannot view it 
downstream before up in the example presented. However, there is no causal principle 
that determines the objectivity of viewing bow before stern, rather the time 
determination in the second is merely subjective based; merely upon that which the 
subject views first in apprehension. Now the reason that it must be a causal principle 
is that to give this determination a necessity to which state of affairs is placed first an 
a priori law of the understanding must be invoked, as the a priori laws are that which 
give necessity, and this law being particularly that of causality (B234).  In our 
example there must be a cause that is presented which leads to the state of the ship 
being down stream, for example it may be the direction of wind blowing against the 
sails at the position up stream which leads necessarily, through the principle of 
causality, that the ship in a latter state of affairs must be down stream, its position 
down stream being the effect of this cause. Thus, it could not be that in such a case 
the ship was first down stream then up stream, because of the causal laws involved in 
this particular example, hence we can ground an objective time determination in 
regards to which state of affairs necessarily succeeds the other.  
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However, many commentators have taken that what Kant is presenting here is that in 
any preceding state of affairs the cause of the latter must be found. One of the most 
famous critiques from this interpretation comes from Schopenhauer who charged, “we 
think night follows day without being caused by day” (italics in original, Guyer 1987, 
260). As Guyer explains in his book Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (1987, 260) 
this is not really a problem for Kant. Kant’s conception of the principle of causality 
should not be taken to mean that the prior state is necessarily the cause of the 
successive state, rather that there must merely exist a causal rule from which the 
successive state must succeed the prior state. This could be taken to say that a third 
state of affairs is necessary to lead from the prior to the latter state. Take our previous 
example in the discussion of the first analogy regarding wood; the prior state of wood 
being present does not necessarily lead to the state of smoke and ash, rather a third 
state of affairs would be required to cause such, that of the burning of the wood. 
Though the previous state does not contain within it the cause of the latter, it requires 
an addition of cause and the formulation of a third state of affairs between the two to 
facilitate the succession allowing the objective time determination that one must 
succeed the other to be given. 
 
From the interpretation that Guyer presents we can also find a defence against the 
problem of simultaneous cause and effect. Kant defended his principle of causality 
against this issue on the basis of a vanishingly brief time (A203/B248), however as 
Guyer (1987, 261) points out it seems Kant had missed that there was a much easier 
solution to the issue. If we take the interpretation that the cause does not necessarily 
have to exist in the prior state, rather that the addition of a cause is required to 
facilitate the latter state, even if this addition occurs at the same moment in time as the 
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effect, then we can deal with this issue. It is that the causal rule still holds here and 
allows an objective time determination regardless and gives us the ability to still hold 
to this principle even if the cause is not prior to the effect, because the cause is still 
required before the prior state is able to alter into the latter, allowing us to still hold an 
objective time determination of one state before the other.  
 
However, we do not need to take Guyer’s interpretation here to deal with such issues, 
for Kant himself stated, “every change has a cause that manifests in the entire time 
wherein the change takes place” (A208/B253). This is to say that the prior state is 
merely the beginning of the change and the latter state the end, there is in turn a 
multitude (of which none are of the smallest magnitude) of stages that any change 
must go through and in this totality is where the causal rule must be found, not 
necessarily in any one preceding state. Thus we can still defend Kant against the 
charge that Schopenhauer presented, since no longer would we have to conceive Kant 
to be saying that day necessarily causes night, and furthermore we can defend the 
causal principle against the issue of simultaneity of cause and effect, since the cause 
can be established in the totality of the change rather than necessarily in the prior 
state. Taking this on board we can establish that to analyse Kant’s argument in the 
second analogy through two states of affairs, isolated from all others that are 
presented in the course of experience, would be incorrect, and it would seem this is 
the problem that has lead many commentators to make unfair critiques, such as 
Schopenhauer’s.  Furthermore, taking on board this part of Kant’s argument allows us 
to establish empirical causal chains that allow for this causal rule within a change, 
allowing the establishment of objective time determinations over much longer periods 
than the examples given. For example we would be able to find causes that lead from 
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the birth of Plato to the birth of Kant, through the analysis of the totality of the 
change, rather than either particular state of affairs in-itself (which would seem quite 
problematic in this example) allowing for a total objective time determination of 
history as a whole. It is that experience should be taken and analysed as a totality, not 
as particular independently seperated events.  
 
Thus Kant has completed his refutation of Hume’s issue of causality. Where Hume 
had argued that we hold causality on dogmatic grounds, Kant has now shown that the 
principle of causality is necessary a priori for us to determine objective succession in 
time, since there must be a rule, that of causality, that necessarily leads us to 
determine that substance changes from one determination to another and that such 
change must occur in a necessary order. It is that where Hume had taken causality to 
be determined by our reflective ideas on our experience, Kant has shown that this is 
incorrect;` for causality in itself is necessary to the possibility of experience. If we did 
not have such a rule then we would not be able to determine which determination of a 
substance must follow, we would merely have determinations which could be placed 
in any order allowing us no objective time determination that one must necessarily 
succeed the other, leaving us again with a merely subjective determination of 
empirical objects within time, based solely upon our apprehension of the manifold of 
presentation and thus leaving us no objective knowledge of our experience.  
 
III. The Third Analogy: Community 
 
Finally, we must look to that principle which allows us experience of objective time 
determinations of simultaneity. In the previous discussion of the causal principle, 
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which allows us experience of objective time determinations of succession, we 
encountered the example that we would accept that in regards to certain presentations 
we would be able to view them in a reversible order, say that of the ship’s stern and 
bow, and thus these presentations would not be considered objectively successive in 
time, merely subjectively successive in apprehension. This is to say that such 
empirical objects would appear to exist simultaneous with one another. Thus, we now 
turn to that principle which grounds our experience of objective time determinations 
of objects as simultaneous in time, this principle being that, “[a]ll substances, insofar 
as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction” 
(italics in original, B256).  
 
One might hold that we can establish the simultaneity of empirical objects since when 
we perceive one then another we can always go back to the former, thus we would 
infer a change in state has not occurred and thus both must be found within the same 
time. This however is not a valid argument for Kant, for we must remember that all 
that is given in perception is representations of empirical objects, and our 
representations are always fleeting and transitory, thus, no matter how qualitatively 
similar, we cannot have the same representation once an intermission has occurred 
(Guyer 1987, 271). None the less, an argument such as this would still be reliant upon 
our subjective representations and would give us no objective grounding for the time 
determination of simultaneity, thus we must require something else. 
 
Furthermore, we may take that the lack of a causal law determining irreversibility 
may be that which grounds our time determination of simultaneity. However, for Kant 
this is not valid either, rather this is a symptom of the coexistence, it is not that which 
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necessitates it and gives it its objectivity. Kant stating in the opening paragraph of the 
second edition’s third analogy that; 
“…the synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would indicate for each of 
these perceptions only that it is there in the subject when the other is not, and 
vice versa. But it would not indicate that the objects are simultaneous; i.e., that 
if the one is there then the other is also there in the same time, and that this 
simultaneity of the objects is necessary in order that the perceptions can 
succeed one another reciprocally.” (B257) 
What such an argument would leave us with is a merely subjective time determination 
that that which is presented in the presentations is simultaneous through use of the 
imagination, not that the objects themselves remain existent in the moment of time 
when I am not apprehending them. Eventually this form of argument would lead us 
down a similar track as Berkley, towards a radical idealism, and is what Kant wished 
to avoid for fear of returning to pre-Copernican metaphysics.  
 
Rather there must be something within the objects themselves that determine their 
positioning within the one time relative to one another. It is, as Kant puts it, “for 
things existing outside one another simultaneously we require a concept of the 
understanding of reciprocal succession of their determinations, in order to say that the 
reciprocal succession of the perceptions has its basis in the object and in order thus to 
present the simultaneity as objective” (B257). It is that one substance must be cause 
and effect of the other substances determination in space and vice versa  (since, as 
with time, we cannot perceive space in itself) and this is what we call dynamic 




For if we did not have such a principle then we could be left with the situation in 
which substances are isolated from one another within the one time, meaning that 
they would be separated by empty space and empty space being that which perception 
can’t reach. But without the connection of space these substances could not come 
under any empirical synthesis of experience and we would have no way of 
determining whether they were simultaneously or successively determined within 
time. Thus if we are to have any experience of such we necessarily require this 
principle of community, where the interaction of substances determines a whole and 
allows us an objective basis from which we can determine that objects are 
simultaneous within the one time, which thus facilitates experience.  
 
Chapter 4: Empirical Knowledge and Reason 
 
I. The Analogies and Empirical Knowledge 
 
Now that we have established the principles of the analogies and why they are 
necessary to the possibility of experience we can begin to look at the role they play in 
establishing knowledge. It is crucial to state here that these principles themselves 
allow us no empirical knowledge, but are merely that which gives us the possibility of 
such. They are as Guyer (italics in original, 1987, 246) states “necessary condition[s] 
for the justification, verification or confirmation of the judgements about empirical 
objects that we make on the basis of our representation of them.” Now since these are 
the principles that give us the formal conditions of experience everything given by 
sensation must also be subject to these principles, for if they were not then they would 
not be able to amount to experience. As Kant states “together the analogies say that 
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all appearances reside, and must reside, in one nature; for without this a priori unity 
no unity of experience, and hence also no determination of objects in experience, 
would be possible” (A216/B263). It is without such principles it would be impossible 
for us to have any experience, as we would have no time determination of objects, 
merely subjective determinations of apprehension, and thus nothing that allows us the 
ability to synthetically unify our presentations into a totality of experience. Rather all 
our presentations would become independent of one another in terms of any 
objectivity; instead, merely synthesized under the subjectivity of apprehension.  
 
However, this does not show us how we can lead from these principles to empirical 
knowledge, rather this is found in the next section of the first critique entitled “The 
Postulates of Empirical thought as Such” (A218/B265). The three principles of which 
are; 
“1. What agrees (in terms of intuitions and concepts) with the formal condition 
of experience is possible. 
2. What coheres with the material conditions of experience (with sensation) is 
actual. 
3. That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to universal 
conditions of experience is necessary (exists necessarily).”  
(italics in original, A218/B265) 
It is that the possibility of something, viz., that the concept of it coheres to the a priori 
principle of experience, does not necessarily lead us to the actual object, since we 
have no object to refer to. Rather we need the input of sensation through perception, 
as the material conditions of experience, to allow us to establish what is actual. But 
this still does not give us objective reality on its own as with perception alone we are 
	  
	  32	  
only given representations of objects. Given that which is actual and finding it to also 
be possible, through the application of intuition and concept, we are able to come to 
knowledge of the necessary existence of such as experience that is not only possible, 
but also objectively real. In this case reason’s use is regulative, as it cannot constitute 
in-itself any knowledge of empirical objects. 
 
To come to this empirical knowledge we do require sensation as regulated by the 
principles of the analogies. In perception all we are given is representations, however 
through the regulative use of the principles of experience we are able to move beyond 
our representations and come to knowledge regarding the empirical. For example, I 
can only come to empirical knowledge of the existence of a ship as an empirical 
object, and not merely my representation of it, through the apprehension of the 
presentations which the ship presents to me regulated by way of the principles of 
community, allowing me to determine that all my different presentations of the parts 
of the ship, say the bow, stern, bridge etc., exist simultaneously through interaction, 
regardless of the successive order in which I apprehend all of these parts. I am thus 
able to establish its possibility through the empirical concept of the ship, yet also its 
actuality through the presentations. Thus, I am able to establish its existence as an 
empirical object for which any other person has the possibility to apprehend, since we 
are able to establish the possibility and actuality of such an object, thus giving it its 
necessary existence as a real empirical and knowable object. 
 
Never the less, this is not a full explication of empirical knowledge or knowledge in 
general for Kant. For such we must look to one of the closing chapters of the first 
critique found within the Canon of Pure Reason, entitled “On Opinion, Knowledge 
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and Faith” (A820/B848). Now, of course, what we are concerned with is that concept 
of knowledge. Kant states that knowledge is a form of assent (as are also opinion and 
faith) that contains within it certainty. It must be both subjectively and objectively 
sufficient to allow us to call such assent knowledge, as opposed to just opinion or 
faith (A822/B850). Thus we find that in regards to empirical knowledge, our 
perceptions are that which give us a subjective sufficiency, as all that is given is a 
representation of empirical objects. However, through the application of the structure 
of experience we are able to also gain objective sufficiency of the judgement allowing 
for it to be established as a knowledge claim.  
 
To further address this point we need to look to Kant’s concept of conviction as 
necessary to that of knowledge. Conviction is as Kant puts it “valid for everyone, 
provided [they] have reason, then its basis is sufficient objectively”, however if this is 
not so and we merely have a subjective basis then this is persuasion (A820/B248). 
Kant goes on to state that conviction cannot be distinguished subjectively from 
persuasion; instead we can test the basis in others. Conviction would necessarily 
cause the same effect on the reason of others as for us, for as Chingell (2007, 38) 
argues conviction is involuntary since its grounds are objective. This allows us to 
unfold that which is of subjective in our assent and determine what has sufficient 
objective grounds. Though, as Kant points out, such a test does not lead us directly to 







Chingell (2007, 47) presents Kant’s assent of knowledge as; 
 “S’s assent that p counts as knowledge if 
 (i.) g is a sufficient objective grounds that S has, 
 (ii.) S’s assent is based on g, 
(iii.) on reflection, S would cite g as a sufficient objective ground for his 
assent, and 
(iv.) p is true” 
Now when we apply this to Kant’s conception of empirical knowledge, I can know 
that my grounding for the judgement of the existence of the ship is objective via the 
principles of the analogies as applied regulative to my presentations of the ship’s 
parts, giving it an objective time determination and allowing us the experience of it as 
an empirical object. I can also have conviction of such a judgement because if another 
person were to have the presentations of the ship it would have the same effect upon 
their reason as mine. Thus assent to this judgement is based upon this objective 
validation, and I would be able to cite this as the objective grounds of assent. 
Therefore I can come to assent as knowledge (as opposed to mere opinion or faith) 
that this ship is existent as an empirical object.  
 
II. Empirical Laws and the Systematic Unity of Reason 
 
Just as the analogies alone did not allow us knowledge of empirical objects, they also 
do not allow us the establishing of empirical laws, which underlie the systematic unity 
of reason. Though in the second analogy we find the objective a priori basis of the 
principle of causality as a condition of possible experience, this in-itself is unable to 
allow us to come to any knowledge regarding that of empirical laws of causality. For 
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example, from this we would not be able to determine that iron rusts in water, 
something more must be applied here – and that is experience. This means that, as 
with any form of empirical knowledge, we require content to determine this; sensible 
content can be regulated by the use of reason to allow us to come to this. 
 
The issue for Hume regarding this kind of judgement was that in our application of 
causal principles to our experience, we dogmatically held these principles, which for 
him could only be established through reflection upon experience itself. However, as 
Kant established in the analogies, the principle of causality is an a priori necessary 
condition for the possibility of experience, thus our application of such a principle is 
not dogmatic, nor is it merely determined by reflection on experience. Specific 
empirical causal laws are determined by experience, however the principle of 
causality in-itself is not, thus the issue Hume had presented is made redundant, since 
causality in-itself has a transcendental grounding as an a priori necessary principle of 
the possibility of experience.  
 
How Kant deals with these laws is addressed further by Guyer and Walker in their 
paper “Kant’s Conception of Empirical Law” (1990). These empirical laws are in 
reference to the regulative use of reason, that is that we look to find causal laws in 
particular since it is a necessary requirement of experience. In this reason acts to 
create systematic unity, though as both Guyer and Walker point out, this does not 
necessitate that such unity can be found, however the regulative use of reason 
compels us to search for such unity none the less. As Walker (1990, 247) presents it, 
Kant’s theory requires that we follow the regulative principles of reason, for without 
such we would not be able to establish the laws that govern experience, thus giving us 
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no distinction between objective and subjective time determination, or even subjective 
and objective in general. Therefore, this systematic unity of reason acts as the arbiter 
of any objective truth. 
 
Williams (2013) in his discussion of Walker and Guyer’s work explicated the 
necessary unity of reason with an example; if I was to dream that I won the lotto, 
upon waking I would be able to test this by checking the winning numbers with the 
ticket and if this occurrence had been empirically true then I should find a match, 
however as it was a dream I shall not. In this example what we are particularly 
looking at is the causal connection between experiences, since we must take our 
experience in the context of the necessary unity of reason, allowing us to find the 
truth of the matter. We can see that the causal connection established by reason does 
not exist in this circumstance, since appealing to causality would mean that if this 
judgement were empirically true the winning numbers would match the ticket as 
cause of the win, however they do not, and thus we are able to establish that the 
judgement of winning the lottery holds no empirical truth as it does not fit into the 
necessary unity of reason. 
 
Williams’ example appeals to Kant’s statement in the Critique of Pure Reason that; 
“Whether this or that putative experience is not mere imagination must be ascertained 
according to its particular determinations and through its coherence with the criteria 
of all actual experience” (B279). What this is saying is that in terms of basic 
knowledge claims we can appeal to our collective reasoning regarding our totality of 
experience to analyse our judgements and determine their truth-value. Furthermore 
Kant states, “…the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would 
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have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking 
that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth…” (A651/B679). 
 
However it is important to take on board Kant’s conception of truth here, as stated by 
Walker (1990, 248); 
“Truth in the world of appearances is not and never can be closed and 
complete… For our intuition, the intuition in which we order all the data we 
receive through the senses, is spatio-temporal, and space and time are infinite 
in extent... All we could ever have would be some finite set of data, and 
however large that finite set might be, universal generalisations based upon it-
such as statements of causal law-are always open to refutation from further 
experience.” 
Kant’s solution to this issue is that instead of looking for irrefutable laws to determine 
the basis of truth, we instead must establish where it would be rational to establish 
empirical laws, given that they cannot be irrefutable. We can use a previous example 
to explicate this point, where the law of conservation of matter was held within 
physics: we could have thus taken matter to be substance, since it was a rational law 
to hold based upon both reason and experience. However, with more experience 
physicists were able to refute this law, as it was no longer rational to hold, since it did 
not fit within the systematic unity of reason any more, and instead replaced it with the 
law of conservation of energy. The former law being rational to hold at the time, as 
through the use of the systematic unity of reason it remained coherent with 
experience, however, with further experience physicists have refuted the former 
principle and replaced it with the latter, since the former is no longer coherent. Truth 




We can see here with this explication of Kant’s theory of empirical knowledge a 
general basis in his Copernican revolution. To have any experience at all it is 
necessary that certain rules determining the structure of experience be present within 
the subject of such experience, these being the categories that are objective, since they 
must exist for any form of knowledge to be possible. From this basis Kant is able to 
establish the objectivity of knowledge, since if we are to presuppose that experience is 
possible, then objects of such experience must conform to the principles of the 
analogies that allow us an objective determination of the empirical object’s placing 
within time. By doing this we are able to gain the structure of experience that affords 
us the ability to move beyond our merely subjective representations of empirical 
objects to an objective understanding of empirical objects. This being the basis of any 
knowledge as objective and from which we can begin to establish empirical laws, by 
applying the regulative use of reason to experience, and eventually we arrive at a 
system of nature, from which we can derive truth via the coherence with its overall 
systematic unity. In this we can see Kant’s move beyond both the rationalists and the 
empiricists with regards to his theory of knowledge. 
 
Chapter 5: The Foundations of Husserl’s Epistemological Enquiry 
 
I. The Problem Concerning Justification of Objectivity 
 
Now I would like to discuss Husserl’s theory of knowledge in contrast to that of 
Kant’s. Claire Ortiz Hill (1906/1907, xiii), in her introduction to Husserl’s lectures on 
logic and theory of knowledge, references Husserl’s own personal notes where he 
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states that he would not be able to call himself a philosopher if he was unable to enact 
a critique of reason, similar to the project Kant engaged in.  However, for Husserl he 
had to move beyond Kant’s work, establishing his critique based upon his 
phenomenological method, which he had established in the first volume of the 
Logical Investigations (1900). However, by the time Husserl was giving his lectures 
on logic and knowledge at the University of Göttingen he felt he had moved much 
further beyond the position he had originally presented in the Logical Investigations 
(1900), stating that;  
“Unfortunately, I must time and again bewail the fact that my reflections on 
the meaning of phenomenology in the introduction to my Logical 
Investigations express so very inappropriately the true meaning of the 
investigations and their true method. My publication of the lecture courses on 
theory of knowledge given since 1902 will succeed in redressing the 
situation.” (Husserl 1902/1903, VIII) 
 
Unlike Kant who was responding to the critique Hume had presented against 
inductive reason, and which Kant took to embrace synthetic a priori knowledge as a 
whole, Husserl was responding to the problems of knowledge he himself had 
established, but that he felt permeated throughout the history of philosophy. Husserl’s 
starting point for the problem of knowledge was what he felt was the issue of the 
justification of objectivity within the empirical sciences. This is not to say that 
Husserl saw science itself as problematic, the issue for Husserl was instead that in 
scientific enquiry reflection upon the justifications of empirical science as a whole are 
not made, for this is not the role empirical science plays, instead it is the role 
philosophy plays. Empirical scientists are bound to work within the justifications, not 
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outside of it, thus this reflection upon their own method as a whole is not a 
requirement of their discipline, however for philosophers, this reflection is crucial. 
Empirical scientists justify their method through observation, they come to scientific 
laws through the analysis of what they observe, but the question remains how can we 
justify observation as giving something objective when observation itself and it’s 
application within the sciences are subjective acts? Something must be given in 
observation that goes beyond the subjectivity of the act and justifies the observation 
as the foundation of objectivity within the sciences. An exploration of these issues 
however leads Husserl to the establishing of a new eidetic science of phenomenology. 
 
But not merely in science is this so, for Husserl, rather what this explicates is that, 
“subjective acts provide the reasons for everything” (italics in original, Husserl 
1906/1907, 120). Knowing itself is a subjective act, thus the question that underlies 
any theory of knowledge for Husserl is how the subjective can come to grasp the 
objective in knowledge. What this leads us to is a similar question to Kant’s critical 
project; how is knowledge possible in the first place (Zahavi 2003, 8). It would seem 
an analysis of the role played by the subjective in knowledge would be important 
here, similar to the basis of Kant’s Copernican revolution in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Husserl stating in a lecture given in celebration of Kant, that the Copernican 
revolution was crucial in establishing the movement towards the analysis of the 
subjective (Husserl 1924, 17). 
 
However, Husserl states in his lectures at Göttingen that Kant’s first critique only 
went as far as critiquing a priori and synthetic knowledge, not that of all knowledge 
(Husserl 1906/1907, 133). Husserl argues that a comprehensive critique of knowledge 
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would have to bring into it the critique of empirical knowledge, that is, a critique of 
perception, memory, induction and so forth. Kant’s analogies, as the analysis of the 
conditions of experience, do not achieve this style of critique, they merely present the 
a priori necessary concepts that are required for experience under the assumption 
experience is possible, which Kant himself acknowledges. For Husserl, we must 
venture to the very core of any knowledge to achieve a comprehensive critique of 
knowledge, viz., that all knowledge must be able to be critiqued in a theory of 
knowledge. Husserl is looking for foundational knowledge as this grounding, that 
which is undoubtable as the beginning point of the investigation, which he felt Kant 
had missed when he did not reach to fundamental Cartesian truth as the ultimate 
source of knowledge in the analysis of the consciousness (Husserl 1924, 15). This 
leaves us with questions of even the possibility of this kind of knowledge as 
grounding or whether theory of knowledge is even possible itself.  
 
II. The Problem of Psychologism 
 
So for Husserl any critique of knowledge must bring with it a critique of every form 
of knowledge, including that of mental acts; perception, memory, believing, judging 
etc., however could this not be said to be a psychological endeavour? For Husserl to 
reduce it to this would be problematic, for psychology is still an empirical science and 
in an endeavour to come to a comprehensive critique of knowledge we must be able 
to go beyond this. The problem is that we must distinguish between the object and the 
act of knowing, which psychologism does not afford us. 
 
Particularly, Husserl was responding to the influence of psychologism in regards to 
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logic during his period. Psychologism is the tendency by philosophers to place logic 
within the bounds of psychology, under arguments such as; logic is a discipline that 
studies a subset of the laws of thought, psychology is a discipline that studies all the 
laws of thought, thus, logic must be a form of psychology (Kusch 2011). Particularly 
Husserl was responding to philosophers like Mill who held that; “[i]ts [the Science of 
Logic's] theoretic grounds are wholly borrowed from Psychology, and include as 
much of that science as is required to justify the rules of the art” (Mill 1865, 359). 
 
The major issue for Husserl lies in the conclusions we would be lead to if we hold to 
logical psychologism. If we take for example the law of non-contradiction, in a 
psychological sense, it would be held on the principle that no two contradictory 
judgements can be thought together by any human consciousness. Husserl takes the 
issue that this would lead to the limiting of the law of non-contradiction to one 
conscious being, that of a human consciousness (1906/1907, 144). However, what if 
the divine held contradictory views, which we could not experience and come to 
understand through the use of psychology as an empirical science, would the law of 
non-contradiction still hold? If we were to hold this position of psychologism we 
could become skeptical of logic as purely a law of human reason. We could really 
make no knowledge claims, since we lack certainty regarding the law of non-
contradiction as objectively grounded and thus the affirmation of a proposition could 
not negate the negation of the proposition, both could be simultaneously true beyond 
that of human reasoning. 
 
Of course, we don’t take that logic is about the divine however what the example 
indicates is that logic is about propositions and states of affairs, not merely 
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psychological states. The issue is the mixing of judgement and proposition within 
those who hold to psychologism. For Husserl, a judgement requires a judging subject, 
however a proposition does not. As Husserl states “The proposition is, however, what 
it is, whether it is thought or not” (italics in original, 1906/1907, 140), viz., that a 
proposition goes beyond a judgement and, as Bolzano held, is a ‘sentence in-itself’. 
Psychology, as an empirical science, deals with humans as they empirically are, thus 
if we were to take the position of psychologism logic could only apply to humans as 
they are empirically, biological change could change the rules of logic. Thus when we 
take proposition to be judgement we can see how we would establish logic to be 
within the bounds of psychology, however when we separate propositions, as 
‘sentences in-themselves’, we see how logic moves beyond the bounds of psychology.  
 
What we have really been lead to is Husserl’s distinction between act and meaning 
content. Zahavi (2008, 9) uses the example that when we make the judgement that 
‘Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark’ we can refer both to the meaning content of 
the judgement or the act of the judging itself. The issue is of ideality and reality here; 
the meaning content is ideal in that it remains the same regardless of a change in act, 
however the act itself is the real in that it is temporally bound and fleeting. In 
psychologism the meaning is reduced into the act. This would mean the same ideal 
meaning content of a proposition in judgement could not ever occur more than once, 
since we can never have the same act twice due to the influence of the temporal, real, 
and subjective nature, and the unity of meaning between separate acts would be 





III. The Critical Skepticism of Epistemology 
 
Here we can see the beginning of the development of Husserl’s skepticism at the heart 
of a critique of knowledge. In regards to his critique of knowledge we cannot come to 
take anything for given, everything must be open to the critique so that we may find 
the ultimate undoubtable knowledge from which we can base a theory of knowledge. 
However, critical skepticism, as employed by Husserl, is a very specific kind of 
skepticism. This skepticism is what allows Husserl to establish that epistemology will 
give us the justification for any basis of objectivity, since if we find ultimate 
undoubtable knowledge; these will have the foundation in-themselves to become the 
grounds for new acts of knowledge.  
 
The skepticism that Husserl employs is not that of the traditional skepticism in say the 
usage of the Greeks or Hume. Traditional skepticism was that of dogmatic skepticism 
and in dogmatic skepticism we find inherent problems. In the skepticism of the 
ancient Greeks, who denied the possibility of objectively valid knowledge with 
extreme universality, we find absurdity. It would seem that whilst denying the 
possibility of any objectively valid knowledge, which the Greek skeptics had based on 
argument, they were making claims that in-themselves were objective claims to 
knowledge. This is however an extreme case of dogmatic skepticism, but Husserl still 
holds that all dogmatic skepticism, including modern skepticism of this kind, harbours 
absurdity; it is dogmatic skepticism’s “essential characteristic” (1906/1907, 180). The 
problem being that in regard to this kind of skepticism; “Reason enters into any 
genuine skepticism in conflict with itself” (Husserl 1906/1907, 180).  
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Hume himself accepted this of his own mitigated or “middle” skepticism. Where he 
had caused major issues for the grounding of scientific knowledge in matters of fact, 
he still held that those who would reject the direction of natural science on these 
grounds are deluded. This, for Husserl, shows that Hume’s skepticism, and modern 
skepticism as a whole, is in despair regarding epistemological justification of the 
sciences when we reflect upon such, not an attack on the justification of the sciences 
themselves (Husserl 1906/1907, 181). What instead we require is an appropriate 
skepticism regarding knowledge. 
 
We must establish a critical skepticism, as opposed to the dogmatic skepticism 
historically found in philosophy. Critical skepticism does not deny knowledge due to 
doubt, nor affirms it, but refrains from any judgement on knowledge that is doubtable, 
this being the skepticism we require for a comprehensive theory of knowledge. For if 
we are to assume any knowledge, even a negation of knowledge, as the basis of a 
critique of knowledge it would seem we are committing to circular reasoning, basing 
our articulation of any knowledge on the assumption of knowledge to begin with. Of 
course this raises the issue of whether a theory of knowledge is even possible in the 
slightest, which was the problem Husserl felt Hume found himself faced with 
regarding his skepticism of inductive reasoning. To deal with this we must find the 
grounding knowledge, the ultimate knowledge, that which substantiates itself without 
any assumption of prior knowledge, and that from which we can begin to substantiate 






Chapter 6: Phenomenology as the Foundation of Theory of Knowledge 
 
I. The Phenomenological Reduction 
	  
Husserl’s method for enacting this form of critical skepticism is the 
phenomenological reduction or the epoché (ἐποχή), this word being borrowed from 
the skeptics of ancient Greece. In ancient Greece the term epoché meant the 
suspension of judgement, and this understanding of the term remains paramount in 
Husserl’s own usage. In enacting the epoché we are to suspend judgement of all 
knowledge that is doubtable, enacting a Cartesian form of skepticism. Firstly, we 
must suspend all judgement of existence. In doing this, the position of the epoché 
removes itself from the issue of establishing a metaphysical position regarding being 
as a grounding of knowledge. We are to bracket out anything that we could doubt the 
existence of; it is not that we take it as not existing, instead we are to suspend our 
judgement on its being or not being, avoiding the issue of being altogether. Thus, 
under the epoché we can no longer posit things as having reality, instead we suspend 
such judgements and must deal with the pure immanence of consciousness. We thus 
can only take things in terms of their claims to validity, not as either valid or invalid, 
but as what is immanent.  
 
But if we are to bracket out everything we can doubt what are we left with? If we are 
to doubt everything then we are still doubting, as per the Cartesian position. Vernon 
(2005, 283) explains that Husserl explicates this further than the Cartesian position, it 
is that we must separate the act and content. When we are doubting, we can doubt that 
we are actually doubting, however we cannot doubt that the act of doubting is 
occurring in itself, the distinction is as Vernon puts it “We ‘see’ that we are doubting 
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and we ‘see’ that we ‘see’” (italics in original, 2005, 283). It is this insight, that we 
doubt as an intuitively given act, remains even when we doubt that we doubt as 
object, we cannot doubt the act of consciousness itself. From this position we can 
begin to establish what we are left with in the epoché; what is parenthesized remains 
within the parenthesis. 
 
This leads us to an understanding of a pure consciousness, a transcendental ego, that 
‘sees’ these acts as intentional acts, which themselves cannot be doubted. There is no 
emotion, no theories, no historical relationships to the world for this form of 
consciousness, everything questionable is bracketed out of this consciousness, all it is 
is that which is given as phenomena. In this it is the basis of all consciousness, the 
pure consciousness that deals only with immanence, regardless of whether it were to 
be consciousness in a human, animal or god. In this the ego is reduced from that of 
the empirical ego to a pure transcendental ego as the basis of consciousness (Smith 
1979, 433). All things to this consciousness are phenomena things, not things as given 
with any existential value of being, but merely existing as phenomena. All things 
presented to this consciousness become phenomena-things, for example the colour red 
would be a red-phenomenon rather than an existential being of the colour red. The 
existence of the phenomena as more than just phenomena is something we suspend 
our judgement from in this position of the phenomenological reduction. As Schmitt 
(1959, 240) states, it is not that the content of the phenomenological world differs 
from that of the natural or naïve worldview, but rather the relation to the world is 
changed; the transcendental ego no longer establishes relations of being to things in 




This concept of phenomena, as used by Husserl, is similar to the concept used by 
Kant, but not exactly the same. Kant’s concept of phenomena was things as presented 
through the senses, as opposed to the noumena, which is the concept of things that 
have not been presented through the senses. Noumena are objects exclusively of the 
understanding; an object given to a subject but only by way of its intellect; it is a 
purely intelligible entity. Kant’s concept of phenomena is that of appearances, Husserl 
takes this in a similar way, since he purposefully used the Kantian term. However, 
Husserl does not afford phenomena the undergoing of the categories in the same way 
Kant does, for Husserl looks to the immanence of phenomena as that which 
establishes the grounds for any categories. For Husserl, within the epoché phenomena 
can only be described, since to explain it would be to assume knowledge and move 
beyond it as pure phenomena; phenomenology being a science of description, not 
explanation. Thus, phenomena for Husserl is distinct as that which is purely given to 
the consciousness in immanence, say the phenomenon of a pitch, the phenomenon of 
a touch, the phenomenon of a colour. These phenomena being that which can be 
given to any consciousness, not merely that of human consciousness, as Husserl felt 
Kant had constrained it in his analysis of reason, instead Husserl’s phenomena must 
be as they are for them to be that phenomena regardless of what conscious is 
perceiving them.  
 
II. The Essences of Phenomena 
 
Since phenomena are given in immanence at the basis of all consciousness and since 
we cannot deny consciousness, for to doubt consciousness the act of doubting still 
exists as a conscious act, phenomena can be seen to be that which is the undoubtable 
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from which we can base a theory of knowledge. For if I can doubt my perceptions and 
whether perception is able to give anything objective, I still cannot doubt that 
perception occurs, but just as phenomena, thus we “can make free use of the world of 
phenomena” (italics in original, Husserl 1906/1907, 195). However, all phenomena 
are fleeting, no two phenomena no matter how similar are the same, but the issue here 
is that if phenomena are all fleeting, then wouldn’t it also be that any knowledge 
given from phenomena is also fleeting? 
 
What we need to separate here is phenomena itself from the meaning content of the 
phenomena. Phenomena, similarly to the way representations are for Kant, are 
fleeting because they have a duration, they come, they go, they are not constant and 
thus have a temporal basis for the consciousness as being given at a certain time for 
that consciousness. Thus, phenomena as given with a temporal position for the 
consciousness cannot be the same as even one with the same or similar content that is 
given at another time for that consciousness. However, since we can say they have the 
same or similar content it shows us there is some transcendent unity that permeates 
throughout phenomena with certain content that we see as similar or identical. This 
gives us transcendence-within-immanence, transcendence as grounded in immanence, 
transcendent concepts that do not contain the issue Husserl originally removed in 
bracketing the transcendent during the enacting of the epoché (Moran 2008, 268).  
 
This is the ideal content of phenomena (similar to that ideal meaning content referred 
to earlier in the analysis of propositions vs. judgements), as that which is beyond that 
of the phenomena in-themselves, it is the transcendent-in-immanence. All phenomena 
are individualized and thus different, however in the ideal content that constitutes the 
	  
	  50	  
phenomena we find unity, the concept of a red-phenomena presents to us an ideal of 
red that we can unify as an ideal transcendent concept throughout multiple 
phenomena, the fact we can even say red-phenomena shows the positing of the 
essence that constitutes the determinate colour of the phenomena. This is what 
Husserl refers to as the essence of phenomena. It is that these essences are the non-
temporal ideal concepts that we find throughout the world of phenomena. From this 
we are able to gain more knowledge by abstracting transcendence from that which is 
purely immanent within the position of the epoché. In our example of red-phenomena 
we can establish that in the constitution of phenomena we find colour as a higher-
level essence, as an indeterminate determinate in regard to the red-phenomena. The 
concept red being the determination of the colour thus stating phenomena has colour 
itself is indeterminate in this way, however colour as a constituent of phenomena is 
determined and thus also a determinant on a further abstracted level (Dahlberg & 
Dahlberg 2003). This is what allows us to establish these transcendent ideal concepts 
that constitute the phenomena, as the phenomena that they are, according to these 
essences. 
 
In his lectures at Göttingen Husserl used the example of sound to explicate how we 
can move from these abstractions to come to laws of essence. If we have the 
phenomena of sound A and sound B, which are at different pitches, we are intuitively 
given the relationship of say A higher and B deeper, a relationship of intensity. If we 
then find sound C to be deeper than sound B we are able to immanently intuit that C 
is deeper than A (Husserl 1906/1907, 224). What this affords us is the laws of 
ordering of sound quality, however with further abstraction we are able to establish 
the law of intensity that “any two different intensities belonging to the same quality 
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genus do not form a reversible relation” (Husserl 1906/1907, 224). Relations of 
intensity work under this law for all consciousness, regardless of any existential claim 
of being regarding the phenomena involved in the relation, and this is given through 
mere abstraction of the immanent within the phenomenological reduction (Husserl 
1906/1907 25). Even when we merely imagine an intensity relationship, say sound, it 
must work with regard to the law of essence in regards to intensity, for otherwise it 
would not be a sound, since the law of intensity are necessary to the essence of sound. 
This goes for all laws of essence, they become a priori forms of knowledge founded 
on the transcendent-in-immanence found within the phenomenological world.  
 
III. The a priori Grounds of Knowledge for Husserl  
 
Thus we find the laws of essence and essences themselves to be a priori. Husserl’s use 
of a priori here differs from Kant’s usage of a priori in regard to that of his categories 
of understanding, however we can still see a correlation between the two theories with 
knowledge as grounded in the a priori. The difference lies predominately in the 
method employed by both (Jansen 2013); for Husserl the a priori must be grounded in 
pure essence, for universally valid knowledge must be grounded in the ultimate 
knowledge established from the grounds of immanence within the critical skepticism 
of the epoché. This being a point that he felt Kant had missed when he did not follow 
a phenomenological path in his first critique, but instead where Kant had followed a 
path of analysing reason itself to give the a priori as the conditions for the possibility 
of experience, and where Husserl felt Kant had missed the point that pure immanence, 




Both Kant and Husserl hold to the Copernican view that knowledge must be grounded 
in the a priori, for otherwise we would fall to the criticism that Kant had lain to Hume 
regarding the grounding of experience itself, Husserl’s questioning of the justification 
of observation showing a similar position in this regard. Kant however established the 
a priori categories in regard to human consciousness and reason (Jansen 2013), where 
as Husserl wanted to move beyond just that of human consciousness in establishing 
the a priori laws of essence, since connecting the basis of knowledge to human reason 
and thus bringing epistemology under the scope of psychology is problematic for 
Husserl as he argued in his critique of psychologism. To do such would lead us to the 
path he had presented in his critique of psychologism where we would have the issue 
of knowledge as having to be thought, and the distinction of judgement and 
proposition would be broken down. Thus for Husserl study of the essence of 
knowledge must be in the pure beholding (Husserl 1906/1907, 229). In establishing 
the laws of essence what Husserl is instead seeking to do is find that knowledge 
content that is regardless of whether it is thought or judged by a subject, thus it cannot 
deal with reason itself, it must be given within the phenomenological reduction, and 
this is for Husserl what makes it a priori. Husserl himself stated on the laws of 
essence; “the law itself says nothing about my existence and does not hinge on my 
existence” (italics in original, 1906/1907, 230). Husserl holding that to be an a priori 
law it must exist as a law in such regard, the law itself being independent, rather than 
Kant’s categories that are held as part of the laws of understanding. 
 
Thus, we find that though the two agree on the a priori as the basis of knowledge, 
their respective methodologies for arriving at the a priori knowledge cause major 
differences within each of their epistemological theories and what actually constitutes 
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the a priori. Husserl sought to break away from psychologism and with this he held 
that a priori knowledge could not be argued through reasoning alone but only through 
the immanence of phenomena, since it must go beyond that of an existent ‘I’. 
Something more than reason is required in Husserl’s view, that of the quality of 
giveness, or Evidenz, in the immanence of the reduced position of the epoché rather 
than Kant’s appeal to the laws of reason in establishing the a priori (Jansen 2013).  
 
Chapter 7: From the Phenomenological Reduction to the Empirical 
 
I. Evidenz as Grounded in the Phenomenological Reduction 
 
From these laws of essence we can begin to come to further knowledge. Any 
knowledge claim that can be bought back to the immanence of the phenomenological 
position can then be justified through having Evidenz. The Evidenz lies in that it is 
possible to enact the epoché and show the steps from which the knowledge has 
developed from the a priori in pure giveness, which are founded as immanently given 
or as transcendence-in-immanence within the reduced position of the epoché. Husserl 
explains Evidenz as the quality of giveness, thus the problem of giveness and how an 
object can be said to be given to us is the question of Evidenz (Husserl 1906/1907, 
152). 
 
Vernon states that Evidenz “is the achievement of a conscious act reaching its object” 
(2005, 288). In this it is that which gives us truth; it is that which gives us the object, 
and this giveness is the essence of truth. So in regards to the act of doubt when we 
‘see’ the act of doubt the act of doubt is the object and Evidenz gives this to us 
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directly in insight of the phenomenological immanence of the acts occurrence. 
Furthermore, when we deal with any phenomenon, its intentional components are 
directly given with Evidenz as a claim to validity, the conscious act reaches its object 
since one cannot doubt the phenomenon as a validity claim due to the 
phenomenological immanent insight. For this case the Evidenz, as the quality of 
giveness, is pure, since phenomena are given in the pure immanence of beholding. 
 
Here we can see a contrast to that of Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception as that 
which gives us objects. For Kant objects are given to us under this synthetic unity of 
apperception that necessarily applies the concepts of the categories to that of the 
intuition allowing the establishing of an object of knowledge, but for Husserl the way 
we are given objects of knowledge is through the quality of giveness as Evidenz. The 
accessing of knowledge for consciousness for both thinkers is separated in such a way 
on the basis of the separation of their respective methodologies of how a priori 
knowledge is established and thus what constitutes a priori knowledge. The 
differentiation lies in that which gives the object, for Husserl it being in Evidenz, for 
Kant it being the application of the categories to an intuition. 
 
Thus, for Husserl, when we are able to come to knowledge of essences and laws of 
essence within the epoché we are given pure Evidenz as such things are given as the 
transcedence-in-immanence, we have Evidenz for the method that gives us them. To 
come to know that of red-phenomena is to have Evidenz as it is given purely within 
the epoché. When we abstract in this position and come to find essences and the laws 
of essence this is also given to us with Evidenz, as it is that given by the transcendent-
in-immanence within the reduced position of the epoché. These abstractions of laws 
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of essence are given with pure Evidenz in the phenomenological position, but as 
universals apply universally, so their application goes beyond the phenomenological 
world and applies to the relation within the natural/naïve attitude also. 
 
II. Reason’s Grounding in the Phenomenological Reduction 
 
All reasoning has its Evidenz in being grounded in the laws of essence, we have 
Evidenz for the method that gives us reason from the position of pure immanence 
through the transcendent-in-immanence. As Husserl (1906/1907, 233) states “All 
reason in the a posteriori has its principles a priori”. The principles established 
through the essences are that which govern all use of reasoning for Husserl, very 
similar to Kant’s use of the categories. However, for Husserl his conception of the a 
priori reduces the limits on what these principles can be and rather it is that of pure 
giveness that gives us the ability to abstract the rules of reason, rather than the rules of 
reason as a requisite to pure giveness.  
 
It is not that we constantly, when reasoning, draw back to the position of the epoché, 
but instead it is important that it is possible. This gives us the justification for the use 
of reasoning in such a way. Husserl (1906/1907, 231) uses the example of the law of 
non-contradiction; we must view a different way of justifying it if we are to believe it 
to be genuinely a priori, in Husserl’s usage of a priori. We must find that in the pure 
essence of the concept of truth and proposition that the law of non-contradiction is 
established as a law of essence, viz., that the truth of one proposition must necessarily 
lead to the falsity of the opposite of that proposition as a law of essence. Since we can 
establish laws of essence in such a way and are thus able to apply them in reasoning, 
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all reasoning itself is founded in which we can be brought back to through enacting 
the epoché, and this is what gives reason its objective validity as established a priori 
and applicable as universals. Reason itself is grounded from the transcendent in the 
insight given by that, which is given with Evidenz, under the enactment of the epoché.  
 
This is where Husserl’s answer to the issue of objectivity in the subjective act of 
observation lies, with regards to scientific justification. What any science is engaging 
in is a non-reflective use of the subjective act of observation to establish principles 
from the study of essences and laws of essences. Of course, we can find scientific 
theories to be wrong since they always have subjective elements, but the objective 
grounds gives the Evidenz for their justification. The Evidenz is founded in the 
method used to establish such principles of knowledge, and in justifying it that way 
we find an objective grounds, however this Evidenz is not the pure Evidenz of that 
given in the epoché and can be found to be frustrated with greater Evidenz.  
 
We have a breakdown of the boundaries of subjective and objective in Husserl’s 
establishment of the essences of concepts in this regard, since the pure consciousness 
established in the epoché is able to give us the objective laws of essences and be 
given access to objects as phenomena in pure Evidenz. Thus, the subjective acts are 
able to grasp objects through the use of reason that is embedded in the laws of 
essence, themselves coming from abstraction of the pure insight given in the reduced 
position of the epoché. Evidenz becomes the middle ground, the connecting point, 
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III. Intention and Fulfilment 
 
However, the issue still remains; how can we move from this position, in which we 
have Evidenz, to a position where we can establish Evidenz for that given beyond the 
phenomenological position, and furthermore how we could come to knowledge of the 
empirical? The position of the epoché explicates something more about the basis of 
all consciousness, that of intentionality and the fulfilment of intention. Where Evidenz 
connected the act of consciousness to the object of knowledge we find the explication 
of this foundation of all consciousness as the essence of consciousness itself, thus it 
applies to the natural/naïve position. 
 
In all conscious acts the consciousness is directed towards an object that it intends in a 
certain way, this is the structure of intentionality; this being a law of the essence of 
consciousness itself. When we ‘see’, as Vernon put it, that we are doubting as an act, 
we intend the object as the act of doubting, instead of as the doubtful object itself, and 
this object is given with Evidenz in the immanence of the phenomenological position 
as the phenomena of the act of doubting. However, such applies to any act of 
consciousness, when we direct our consciousness towards a cube in perception, 
memory, imagining etc., we intend it in a certain way, as having the parts that 
constitute a cube. Now when we direct our consciousness towards the object of the act 
of doubting we find that it is given in pure Evidenz as we intend it as the phenomena 
of an act of doubting. This is the fulfilment of our intention as being found as we 
intended it through the giveness of pure Evidenz in intuitive immanence from the 
position of the epoché. This fulfilment of the intention as being given as how it is 




However, when we apply this to the cube as empirically viewed in perception we are 
not given it in the same way, we are unable to establish pure Evidenz as it is no longer 
intended as a cube-phenomenon but as an actually existing cube, bringing with it the 
issue of the object’s being. This brings us to the question of how such could become 
fulfilled. Fulfilment of such still requires a form of Evidenz as the quality of giveness, 
but the Evidenz for such a fulfilment differs from that of the Evidenz given in that of 
the world of phenomena and essences, since we cannot establish pure Evidenz for 
something that claims existential validity.  
 
Instead the Evidenz, as quality of giveness, cannot be pure, as it cannot be given 
purely in the way that phenomena can. Such Evidenz thus leads to proximate 
fulfilment; it is that further Evidenz has the possibility to frustrate the prior fulfilment, 
as the object of the intention could be found to not be given as intended. For example 
we may intend the cube as a whole through appresentation and use the givenness of 
one perspective, say from the front, as the Evidenz for such an intentional fulfilment, 
since it conforms to the essence of a cube from that persespective, but upon further 
inspection from a secondary perspective, say moving the cube around, we find that it 
is not a cube but a regular rectangular prism, since we find four of the sides to be 
rectangular, not square, and thus contradicting the essence of a cube. Thus we find our 
original fulfilment to be frustrated and replaced with the new fulfilment with this 
greater Evidenz, however the identity of the intentional object remains throughout.   
 
Here we can establish that fulfilment works in a series, continued fulfilment is found 
through lived-experience and may be found to frustrate prior fulfilments. Since we 
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have the ability to always look closer at the objects we are directed towards ultimate 
fulfilment for such is often unachievable. We instead gain new Evidenz establishing 
greater proximate fulfilments, unless frustrated and then a greater proximate 
fulfilment is achieved for the new intention towards the same intentional object. To 
come to ultimate knowledge of an object we would have to fulfil every intention 
towards the object, which in most cases is impossible, so we are left with a series of 
fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions in apprehending an object.  
 
Taking fulfilment in such a way does not mean we cannot come to knowledge of an 
object; rather that we gain different levels of knowledge. With lower levels of 
proximate fulfilment we can come to abstracted knowledge. In the example of our 
cube at a distance we may be able to ascertain that there is a shape of some sort, this 
being an abstracted piece of knowledge, as we look at it closer we can come to realise 
it comes under the concept of a rectangular prism. If we then gain adequate fulfilment 
we are able to know the rectangular prism in itself, knowing any distinguishing 
features and such. This is that as greater fulfilment is achieved we are able to come to 
specific and individualized knowledge. At the lower levels of fulfilment we would not 
be able to separate this specific individual from others of the same species, since our 
knowledge of it is only in that of the higher level abstracted species, but as we come 
to greater fulfilment through the viewing of the object we are able to come to greater 
individuated knowledge which distinguishes it from the others in the species.   
 
Of course, this conception of fulfilment relies heavily on subjectivity, but the 
importance is establishing how this subjective consciousness can come to knowledge 
for itself. Any concept of real existing objects as being implies the existence of the ‘I’ 
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(which is reduced to the transcendental ego of pure consciousness in the position of 
the epoché) and is in a relative existence to the being of the ‘I’ for which the existence 
can be posited, this cannot be escaped. Hence, we cannot escape such subjectivity 
since we have lived-experience and Husserl’s concept of fulfilment is reliant on this 
principle, since we are continually establishing greater fulfilments or finding others to 
be frustrated, but it is this subjectivity of lived-experience that finds its objective 
grounding of knowledge in the concepts of essences and the laws of such that give to 
it the ability, through Evidenz, to grasp the objects the consciousness directs itself 
towards through the act of intention. It is that intentionality is a bringing together of 
both subjective and objective elements via the mediation of the Evidenz of giveness. 
 
IV. Reaching the Objects ‘in-themselves’ 
 
Unlike Kant, Husserl held that we can reach objects ‘in-themselves’ and he requires 
no concept similar to Kant’s noumena to facilitate the objects of intention, for as 
Willard (1995, 148) states the real object is the intentional object and vice versa, thus 
if the real object does not exist, neither does the intentional. For Husserl it is that we 
can have an intention that exists, but the intentional object may not. This we saw as 
the grounding point of the epoché in that we could establish the intentional act of 
doubting without positing any existential validity on the object of the doubt, namely 
doubt itself.  
 
Where we can come to grasp the object itself is through its parts. When we intend an 
object in a way we can access the intentional content through its parts as independent 
of the intentional constitution of the object. There are parts of experience that we do 
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not intend, for example the parts that make up a whole such as the colour, and we thus 
compare these parts of the object in-itself with our intentional content to see if they fit 
together. When we intend an object as a cube and find it to be regular rectangular 
prism we find that the parts that are given to us do not match the way we represent 
them in the intended cube, the parts however are given to us ‘as they are’. But we 
would not say that any change has occurred to the intentional object, its identity 
remains unchanged, the parts that make it the object it is remain, and it is instead that 
our intentional act towards the object has changed.  To intend an object in a certain 
way does not change it, its parts that make up the whole remain the same. In gaining 
fulfilment of the object we look to the parts that are given of the object and whether 
they match the way we have intended it in unity, this is that we access the objective 
parts and this is what affords us the fulfilment or frustration of the intention. It is not 
that our intention can change the way in which these parts can be given to us, since 
they are that which confirms the intention and if this were not so Husserl would be 
appealing to an extreme form of idealism, which he is not.  
 
Thus, knowledge can be taken for Husserl as a higher order act. It is not merely the 
act of fulfilment of an intention, rather, how Husserl himself states it;  
“in fulfilment, the object is ‘given’ intuitively in the same way in which the 
mere meaning means it…. The ideally conceived element which thus 
coincides with the meaning is the fulfilling sense, and… through this 
coincidence, the merely significant intention (or expression) achieved relation 
to the intuitive object (expressed this and just this object).”  
(italics in original, LI 743) 
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It is that when we come to knowledge of an object it is that we can connect a union of 
the conceptual meaning associated with the intuited object through perception. This 
here is what knowledge is as an act (Willard 1995, 152), as follows. In establishing 
knowledge as this act it shows that the object of knowledge itself is not changed in the 
act of knowing. Knowing itself, for Husserl, is as Willard (1995, 155) puts an external 
act. The object and the concept are unified in the act of knowing, but they are still 
separate and thus the relationship of the act of knowing the object and the object itself 
in this union can come into and go out of being, but the identity of the object remains 
regardless. Willard summarizes this point as; 
“The property of being hit by bat x at time t does not produce or destroy the 
identity of the ball, but, in fact, presupposes that identity as determining what 
is and was hit. It is the same for the property of being known by person x at 
time t. Both the relation of hitting and that of knowing are ‘external,’ and the 
properties which they impose on their relata are contingent, with a coming and 
going that can, in suitable cases, be observed.”  
(italics in original, Willard 1995, 156) 
 
This is a major difference from the Kantian position, which holds that for an object to 
be known it must necessarily conform to the concepts of the understanding which 
allow us the grasping of the object, in contrast to the concept of noumena which we 
cannot grasp as it does not conform to such. For Husserl, it is that the conceptual 
meaning we hold is formed into a relationship with the object, but the object as it is 
intuitively given remains in the in-itself, unchanged by the concept or the act of 
knowing. Ricoeur (1966) comes to the conclusion in his paper entitled “Kant and 
Husserl” that this really is a difference in the objectifying for each philosopher. 
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Husserl rejected the Kantian conception of the thing in-itself as noumena, since 
Husserl instead held that a thing in-itself is merely the parts unified in the concept, the 
conceptual unified meaning being applied by the subject, however these parts can be 
given ‘as they are’. Kant however held that there are two forms of objectifying, the 
appearance which is not our representation of it, which becomes the empirical object, 
this being similar to the level Husserl takes it, but then the further level that of the 
ding an-sich, the thing in-itself, as inaccessible to consciousness, but as that which 
constitutes phenomena.  
 
However, this difference seems to hold from the way they deal with the a priori. Kant 
basing his a priori argument on finding these concepts at the base of understanding, 
where Husserl held that we needed to go back to that which is given with pure 
Evidenz under the epoché. Any object of knowledge for Kant is thus held on the basis 
that it must necessarily conform to these laws of the understanding, however for 
Husserl objects of knowledge exist outside of the act of knowing, as that which is 
given intuitively in immanence. The object of knowledge as a thing in-itself, which 
given with Evidenz, is thus required for knowledge to be possible, since it is that 
which allows the fulfilment of an intention and the act of knowing, without an object 
as in-itself this form of fulfilment would not be possible and neither would knowledge 
itself, since the object as itself is an essential part of the act of knowing, but the act of 









Originally in deciding the topic for this thesis I sought to show the common usage of 
the method presented by the Copernican revolution. However, as I studied further and 
further into this topic I found that in analysing the two philosophers respective 
theories of knowledge it became apparent that the major difference in methodology 
regarding the discovering of the a priori grounds of knowledge permeated throughout, 
leading to the divergence in their respective theories of the accessibility of das ding 
an-sich or the thing in-itself. I found that my thesis direction changed to attempt to 
explicate the grounds of this difference in the different methods in which each sought 
to answer similar questions regarding the possibility of knowledge.   
 
Kant’s process stems from his analysis of synthetic a priori concepts as the laws of 
understanding. What Kant sought was to find if there are any valid claims of synthetic 
a priori knowledge, since he felt this question was the consequence of Hume’s 
critique of inductive reasoning. The issue he raised against Hume was how do we 
come to a valid claim that knowledge is even possible if we do not have the 
knowledge that experience can give us any knowledge prior. Thus, Kant turned his 
position to look at what would allow the possibility for such, this leading to his 
Copernican revolution. 
 
However, Husserl tried to distance himself from grounding knowledge in reasoning, 
in the way Kant had, as he wished to distance himself from any form of 
psychologism, which he saw as problematic. Husserl particularly wanted to establish 
objective validity for all kinds of knowledge, and not restrict it to that of a human 
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consciousness. As Bachyrycz argues; “the phenomenology of the Logical 
Investigations is meant to provide transcendental philosophy with a surer 
epistemological footing than Kant is able to provide” (2009, 47). 
 
This leads Husserl to distinguish his method of establishing what constitutes a priori 
knowledge from that of Kant’s. For Husserl, truly a priori knowledge can only be 
constituted as independent and thus must be derived from immanence or the 
transcendent-in-immanence as given in the phenomenological reduction. This leads 
Husserl to find some similarities to Kant within his a priori knowledge, however his 
ability to come to them differs and allows for a greater amount of a priori knowledge 
than Kant’s analysis of the laws of reason does. This divergence in their respective 
methodologies is what constitutes their differences regarding the accessibility of das 
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